Acknowledged
Created: Jun 18, 2025
Updated: Sep 4, 2026
Resolved Date: Jun 19, 2025
Found In Version: 10.25.33.1
Severity: Standard
Applicable for: Wind River Linux LTS 25
Component/s: Kernel
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:EOL][EOL]bpf: Don't use tnum_range on array range checking for poke descriptors[EOL][EOL]Hsin-Wei reported a KASAN splat triggered by their BPF runtime fuzzer which[EOL]is based on a customized syzkaller:[EOL][EOL] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0[EOL] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888004e90b58 by task syz-executor.0/1489[EOL] CPU: 1 PID: 1489 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.19.0 #1[EOL] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS[EOL] 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014[EOL] Call Trace:[EOL] <TASK>[EOL] dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xc9[EOL] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x1f0[EOL] ? bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0[EOL] kasan_report.cold+0xeb/0x197[EOL] ? kvmalloc_node+0x170/0x200[EOL] ? bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0[EOL] bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0[EOL] ? arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher+0xd0/0xd0[EOL] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x43/0x70[EOL] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x3e8/0x640[EOL] ? bpf_obj_name_cpy+0x149/0x1b0[EOL] bpf_prog_load+0x102f/0x2220[EOL] ? __bpf_prog_put.constprop.0+0x220/0x220[EOL] ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110[EOL] ? __might_fault+0xd6/0x180[EOL] ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0[EOL] ? lock_is_held_type+0xa6/0x120[EOL] ? __might_fault+0x147/0x180[EOL] __sys_bpf+0x137b/0x6070[EOL] ? bpf_perf_link_attach+0x530/0x530[EOL] ? new_sync_read+0x600/0x600[EOL] ? __fget_files+0x255/0x450[EOL] ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0[EOL] ? fput+0x30/0x1a0[EOL] ? ksys_write+0x1a8/0x260[EOL] __x64_sys_bpf+0x7a/0xc0[EOL] ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x21/0x70[EOL] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90[EOL] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd[EOL] RIP: 0033:0x7f917c4e2c2d[EOL][EOL]The problem here is that a range of tnum_range(0, map->max_entries - 1) has[EOL]limited ability to represent the concrete tight range with the tnum as the[EOL]set of resulting states from value + mask can result in a superset of the[EOL]actual intended range, and as such a tnum_in(range, reg->var_off) check may[EOL]yield true when it shouldn't, for example tnum_range(0, 2) would result in[EOL]00XX -> v = 0000, m = 0011 such that the intended set of {0, 1, 2} is here[EOL]represented by a less precise superset of {0, 1, 2, 3}. As the register is[EOL]known const scalar, really just use the concrete reg->var_off.value for the[EOL]upper index check.
CREATE(Triage):(User=lchen-cn) [CVE-2022-49985 (https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-49985)