Wind River Support Network

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  ethtool: cmis: require exact CDB reply length  Malicious SFP module could respond with rpl_len longer than what cmis_cdb_process_reply() expected, leading to OOB writes. Malicious HW is a bit theoretical but some modules may just be buggy and/or the reads may occasionally get corrupted, so let's protect the kernel.  The existing check protects from short replies. We need to protect from long ones, too. All callers that pass a non-zero rpl_exp_len cast the reply payload to a fixed-layout struct and read fields at fixed offsets, with no version negotiation or short-reply handling:    - cmis_cdb_validate_password()   - cmis_cdb_module_features_get()   - cmis_fw_update_fw_mng_features_get()  so let's assume that responses longer than expected do not have to be handled gracefully here. Add a warning message to make the debug easier in case my understanding is wrong...  Note that page_data->length (argument of kmalloc) comes from last arg to ethtool_cmis_page_init() which is rpl_exp_len.  Note2 that AIs also like to point out overflows in args->req.payload itself (which is a fixed-size 120 B buffer, on the stack), but callers should be reading structs defined by the standard, so protecting from requests for more data than max seem like defensive programming.