Wind River Support Network

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  usb: typec: ucsi: ccg: reject firmware images without a ':' record header  do_flash() locates the first .cyacd record with  	p = strnchr(fw->data, fw->size, ':'); 	while (p < eof) { 		s = strnchr(p + 1, eof - p - 1, ':'); 		... 	}  If the firmware image contains no ':' byte,  strnchr() returns NULL. NULL compares less than the valid kernel pointer eof, so the loop body runs and strnchr() is called with p + 1 == (void *)1 and a length of roughly (unsigned long)eof, causing a wonderful crash.  The not_signed_fw fallthrough earlier in do_flash() and the chip-state branches in ccg_fw_update_needed() allow an unsigned blob to reach this loop, so a root user who can place a crafted file under /lib/firmware and write the do_flash sysfs attribute can trigger the oops.  Bail out with -EINVAL when the initial strnchr() returns NULL.