Wind River Support Network

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  ALSA: FCP: do not copy out an uninitialised init response  fcp_ioctl_init() allocates its response buffer with kmalloc() and copies the whole buffer back to userspace:  	buf_size = init.step0_resp_size + init.step2_resp_size;  	void *resp __free(kfree) = 		kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL); 	... 	if (copy_to_user(arg->resp, resp, buf_size)) 		return -EFAULT;  Nothing clears the buffer, and the only writer of its leading step0_resp_size bytes is the step-0 control transfer:  	err = snd_usb_ctl_msg(dev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev, 0), 		FCP_USB_REQ_STEP0, 		USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_DIR_IN, 		0, private->bInterfaceNumber, 		step0_resp, private->step0_resp_size); 	if (err < 0) 		return err;  usb_fill_control_urb() does not set URB_SHORT_NOT_OK, so a short or zero-length data stage completes with status 0 and snd_usb_ctl_msg() returns a small actual_length.  The only check is err < 0, so a short transfer is accepted as success.  snd_usb_ctl_msg() copies the full size back unconditionally:  	buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL); 	... 	memcpy(data, buf, size);  Bytes the device never wrote are therefore restored into resp unchanged and copied to userspace.  step0_resp_size and step2_resp_size are each validated only to 1..255, so the caller also picks the slab cache, from kmalloc-8 up to kmalloc-512.  On 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), device answering step 0 with a zero-length data stage, s0 = s2 = 255:    # init_on_alloc off, no spray   step0 window [0,255): nonzero=94/255   000: 00 80 60 06 00 00 ff ff 18 00 00 00 57 01 ea 01   010: 08 78 22 13 00 00 ff ff a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff    # same kernel, kmalloc-512 pre-seeded with an 8-byte tag   step0 window [0,255): nonzero=219/255  tagbytes=232    # identical run, init_on_alloc=1   step0 window [0,255): nonzero=0/255  tagbytes=0    # all three runs   step2 window [255,510): device words matched=62/62  a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff is the little-endian kernel text address ffff8000805fc4a8.  The step-2 window is unaffected, so the disclosure is exactly the step-0 region.  Zero the buffer, and require the step-0 transfer to deliver the full step0_resp_size bytes so a short data stage is reported as an error.  Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>

CVEs

• CVE-2026-80970