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Acknowledged

LIN1022-11381 : Security Advisory - linux - CVE-2024-49861

Created: Oct 21, 2024    Updated: Mar 23, 2026
Resolved Date: Mar 23, 2026
Found In Version: 10.22.33.1
Severity: Standard
Applicable for: Wind River Linux LTS 22
Component/s: Kernel

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Fix helper writes to read-only maps

Lonial found an issue that despite user- and BPF-side frozen BPF map
(like in case of .rodata), it was still possible to write into it from
a BPF program side through specific helpers having ARG_PTR_TO_{LONG,INT}
as arguments.

In check_func_arg() when the argument is as mentioned, the meta->raw_mode
is never set. Later, check_helper_mem_access(), under the case of
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE as register base type, it assumes BPF_READ for the
subsequent call to check_map_access_type() and given the BPF map is
read-only it succeeds.

The helpers really need to be annotated as ARG_PTR_TO_{LONG,INT} | MEM_UNINIT
when results are written into them as opposed to read out of them. The
latter indicates that it's okay to pass a pointer to uninitialized memory
as the memory is written to anyway.

However, ARG_PTR_TO_{LONG,INT} is a special case of ARG_PTR_TO_FIXED_SIZE_MEM
just with additional alignment requirement. So it is better to just get
rid of the ARG_PTR_TO_{LONG,INT} special cases altogether and reuse the
fixed size memory types. For this, add MEM_ALIGNED to additionally ensure
alignment given these helpers write directly into the args via *<ptr> = val.
The .arg*_size has been initialized reflecting the actual sizeof(*<ptr>).

MEM_ALIGNED can only be used in combination with MEM_FIXED_SIZE annotated
argument types, since in !MEM_FIXED_SIZE cases the verifier does not know
the buffer size a priori and therefore cannot blindly write *<ptr> = val.

========Wind River Notice========
*Mitigation:*
Customers can use kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled sysctl to prevent unprivileged users from being able to use eBPF. This would require a privileged user with CAP_SYS_ADMIN or root to be able to abuse this flaw reducing its attack space.

Inspect kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled sysctl with the command:

cat /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled

The setting of 1 would mean that unprivileged users can not use eBPF, mitigating the flaw.

echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled


For more details, please refer to Linux kernel official document:
https://docs.kernel.org/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.html#unprivileged-bpf-disabled

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